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The gradual Islamization process and
the increasing accentuation of the Is-
lamic identity of Bangladesh has signif-
icantly facilitated the growth and de-
velopment of Jama'at-e-Islami (JI). Even
though Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
first leader of Bangladesh known for
his secular moorings and commit-
ments, initially banned all religious
parties and groups, he was eventually
compelled to recognize the impor-
tance of religious identity and started
using Islamic symbolism. The entry of
the military into the political arena fol-
lowing the assassination of Mujib in
1975 furthered the Islamization
process which was a prime supporter of military rule since its conserv-
ative elements supported the religious agenda. As a result, in 1976 Is-
lamic parties were legalized and allowed to participate in local and na-
tional elections. The new constitution, introduced in 1977, replaced
secularism with ‘absolute trust and faith in the almighty Allah.’ Two
years later, Gen. Ziaur Rahman amended the preamble and introduced
a salutation to Allah. JI became the principal beneficiary of the de-sec-
ularization process. A statement by JI’s current leader, Ameer Motiur
Rahman Nizami, aptly sums up the party’s political strategic outlook. In
his view, JI’s aim ‘is to establish a modern and progressive Islamic wel-
fare state by mobilizing public opinion through constructive pro-
grammes and a systematic and peaceful movement.’1
Electoral politics
Initially JI competed in the Jatiya Sangsad (Parliamentary) elections
as part of a joint platform with the Muslim League, and then in 1986,
having gained confidence, opted to participate in the elections on its
own and secured ten seats. By the time the first truly multiparty elec-
tions were held in 1991, the Islamization process was firmly in place,
and the rehabilitation of JI was complete since its previous opposition
to the liberation of East Pakistan in 1971 had ceased being a political li-
ability. In 1991 it secured 6 percent of the popular vote and eighteen
seats in the 300-member Jatiya Sangsad. Its strength dwindled to three
seats in 1996 but rose to seventeen seats five years later.
Parliamentary elections do not alone portray the growing influence
of JI. The pressures of electoral arithmetic compelled both the secular-
ly oriented Awami League, led by Mujib’s daughter Hasina, and the
right wing Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Gen. Zia’s widow
Khaleda, to seek JI’s support. In the bargain the Islamic party has
emerged as a major player in coalition-building. Its strength lies in its
ability to forge issue-based partnerships with diverse groups even
while retaining its Islamic credentials. JI is not averse to uniting in com-
mon cause with the two principal forces in Bangladesh and has actual-
ly capitalized on the mutual antagonism and animosity between Hasi-
na and Khaleda.
Thus in some form or another, JI has been instrumental in the forma-
tion of all three governments since 1991. The alliance with JI largely en-
abled the BNP to secure absolute majority victories in 1991 and 2001.
Dissolution of this alliance proved costly in 1996 when the Awami
League secured the largest number of seats in the Jatiya Sangsad. Al-
though the BNP is seen as the natural
ally of JI, even the Awami League was
not averse to reaching tactical under-
standings with the Islamic group. At-
tempts by Hasina (1996-2001) with her
secular credentials, to co-opt JI during
the opposition’s boycott of parliament,
considerably enhanced the political
acceptability of JI.
The Islamization of Bangladesh and
the growth of JI are manifestations of
the far-reaching changes taking place
in Bangladesh. Despite its vowed com-
mitment to secularism, for example,
the Awami has adopted a number of
overtly religious policies to win over
mainstream voters. During the recent elections, it promised in its man-
ifesto not to enact any legislation running contrary to the Qur'an and
pledged to establish a shari'a bench in the Supreme Court. JI, which
competed in the election as an ally of BNP, sought to regulate and in-
stitutionalize ‘mosque-based education.’ Other parties have also
adopted overtly religious standpoints and policies in their mani-
festoes.
Contrary to initial expectations, the September 11 attacks in the US did
not neutralize the growing power of the Islamic parties in Bangladesh.
JI went on to secure more seats in Jatiya Sangsad than at any previous
time. If one includes the seats won by other religious parties in the
total, the Islamists secured thirty-three seats.2
Having managed to influence—and also to highly benefit from—the
Islamization process, JI has opted for gradualism as its electoral strate-
gy. The party has recognized the difficulties of securing power in a per-
sonality-dominated society through the religious agenda alone. With a
long-term approach in mind it looks to students and women as its
prime constituents. The two portfolios that JI currently holds in the
BNP-led government underscore the rural focus of the party. While the
JI leader, Motiur Rahman Nizami, was the minister of agriculture, his
colleague Ali Ahsan Mohammad holds the social welfare portfolio. And
in a country that is almost entirely agro-based, the importance of an
agricultural portfolio is obvious, and likewise much of the Bangladeshi
population depends upon the state for its welfare. This perhaps ex-
plains Nizami’s shunting out to a less significant industry portfolio dur-
ing the May 2003 cabinet reshuffling.
Jama'at as an alternative
Neither the BNP nor the Awami could afford to ignore JI in any future
coalition-making. By contributing to Khaleda’s spectacular victory in 2001
JI has acquired significant leverage vis-à-vis the BNP. Therefore, the suc-
cess of any attempts by Hasina to unseat Khaleda, either at the next Jatiya
Sangsad elections or through the time-tested strategy of street protests,
would depend upon Hasina’s ability to wean JI away from the BNP. In
short, both Khaleda and Hasina would be wise to enlist the support of JI
before facing the electorate, thereby further enhancing JI’s bargaining
powers.
Moreover, the power base of the country’s main protagonists also
favours JI. While the BNP is seen as an elitist party with an urban fol-
lowing, comprised mainly of professionals and the military, the
Politics
As a coalition partner in the ruling coalition,
Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) occupies an important
place in Bangladeshi politics. The party has
come a long way since its opposition to the
liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, and has
gradually established itself as a key player in
national politics. Over the years, it has
adopted moderate right wing positions,
focused itself on social welfare activities,
consolidated its political base through skillful
manoeuvres, and forged successful electoral
alliances. In so doing, it has expanded its
influence and emerged as a key player in
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Awami’s strength lies in the middle classes of rural Bangladesh, com-
prised of teachers, shopkeepers and other literates. The lower strata of
rural Bangladesh, which is largely comprised of agricultural labourers,
provide a fertile ground for JI and its Islamization campaign. The
m a d r a s a-based education system, which is dominant in the rural areas,
also works in favour of JI. In short, since much of the Bangladeshi pop-
ulation is rural, economically backward, and illiterate, neither the BNP
nor the Awami League would be able to stem—let alone reverse—the
growth of JI. 
The growth of JI is also facilitated by the absence of any ideological di-
vide between the Awami League and the BNP; both of these parties em-
brace extremely personalized ideologies centred completely on the
two leading ladies themselves. JI on the contrary, does not suffer from
any of these negative associations and instead enjoys the reputation of
being a clean, ideologically firm and corruption-free party. Because it is
cadre-based, JI is more disciplined than the mass-based Awami League
and BNP parties. As the most well organized and tightly knit party, as
well as possessing such a well defined and disciplined cadre, JI is able to
attract a wide section of support through a host of local networks and
social welfare programmes. Calculatedly, JI knows—and exploits the
fact—that the goodwill and popularity it generates through various
welfare activities in the community will transform into political support
and electoral gains. This mass appeal enables JI to easily mobilize finan-
cial resources without resorting to corrupt prac-
tices. Given these circumstances, it is likely that JI
could prove to be a credible and corruption-free
alternative to the BNP and Awami League. 
N o t e s
1 . Speech by Ameer Nizami in September
2003. Full text can be found at
http://www.jamaat-e-islami.org 
2 . The seats won by the religious parties are as
follows: JI 17; Islamic Oikye Jote (IOJ) 2; and
Islami Jatiya Oikya Front (IOJF) 14. The first
two parties competed in the 2001 elections
under the four-party alliance led by the BNP. 
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